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Although Turkey had no past colonial involvement with African countries, there has been an 
increasing revival of Turkey’s relation with the continent since the end of the 1990s, which 
reached a peak after 2005. From then on, along with a focus on Central Asia, the Balkans and 
the Middle East, Turkish foreign policy started shifting its focus to Africa, and as a new donor 
country Turkey’s political and economic relations with sub-Saharan African countries have 
intensified significantly. This policy brief analyses and discusses the main economic, political, 
and strategic motivations behind these shifts and priorities, as well as some of the perceptions 
and current challenges this change in policy faces. 
Introduction
Although Turkey had no past colonial involvement with 
African countries, there has been an increasing revival in 
its relations with the continent since the end of the 1990s, 
reaching a peak after 2005, which can be fundamentally 
explained by the important cultural ties they share. From 
then on, along with a focus on Central Asia, the Balkans 
and the Middle East, Turkish foreign policy started shifting 
its emphasis towards Africa, and as a new donor country its 
political and economic relations with sub- Saharan African 
countries have intensified significantly. This policy brief will 
analyse and discuss the main  economic, political and 
strategic motivations behind these shifts and priorities, as 
well as some of the main perceptions of these moves and 
the challenges faced by Turkish foreign policy in this 
regard.
The political dimensions of Turkey’s focus  
on Africa
In 1998 the Turkish “Opening to Africa Action Plan” was 
officially announced, which was specifically aimed at 
improving the political, economic, development, and 
 cultural relations between Turkey and African countries. Its 
goals included increasing the number of Turkish diplomatic 
missions in Africa and high-level diplomatic exchanges 
with the continent, increasing humanitarian and develop-
ment aid (including Turkey’s potential membership of the 
Africa Ex-Im Bank), encouraging business trips, and 
becoming a donor to the African Development Bank. All 
these goals were more or less achieved in the following 
years, primarily reflected in the opening of new embassies 
in various African countries.1
After 2002 the Justice and Development Party government 
continued and intensified the process launched by previous 
Turkish governments, and in 2003 the undersecretary of 
foreign trade prepared a “Strategy for Improving Economic 
Relations with African Countries”. In 2005 Turkey obtained 
observer status at the African Union (AU), while the same 
year was declared as a “Year of Africa” in Turkey. In 
January 2008 Turkey became an AU “strategic partner”, 
which paved the way for the Turkey-Africa Cooperation 
Summit held in Istanbul with the participation of 49 African 
countries, and which was considered the beginning of a 
steady and sustainable cooperation process. In addition to 
this, in 2008 Turkey was also accepted as a non-regional 
member of the African Development Bank and as a 
member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Develop-
ment Partners Forum. In this context of increased political 
and diplomatic involvement, Turkey clearly assumed the 
role of a new actor in some relevant areas in the African 
continent, attaching particular importance to peace and 
stability in the continent, which was reflected in the 
country’s contributions to the United Nations (UN) and AU 
missions deployed in the continent. Turkey is currently 
1 In 2009 in Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire; in 2010 in Cameroon, Mali, Uganda, Angola and Madagascar; in 2011 in Zambia, Mauritania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe; in 2012 
in Somalia; and in 2013 in Ghana.
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providing personnel and contributing financially to five2 of 
the existing UN missions in Africa. Turkey also used this 
political leverage and involvement to support its candidacy 
for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for the 
2009-10 period, gaining almost all of the African countries’ 
votes.  
The economic dimension: between trade  
and development aid
Turkey’s political engagement with Africa has also been 
matched by an intensification of economic and commercial 
relations between it and some African countries. Economi-
cally, both sides benefit from increased trade and develop-
ment cooperation because it creates employment and 
investment. This economic involvement can be divided into 
the categories of trade relations and development aid. In 
terms of trade, it is possible to observe progress, especially 
between 2000 and 2008. In 2000 Turkey’s trade with 
sub-Saharan African countries was worth $742 million; by 
2008 it had increased to $5.7 billion (MFA, 2013). However, 
fluctuations appeared after 2008. According to the 2012 
figures, while steel and iron products have represented the 
highest share of Turkey’s exports to sub-Saharan Africa 
(worth nearly $1 billion), pearls, valuable stones and 
jewellery are the main imports from Africa (worth nearly 
$813 million) (MoE, 2013). As a result of the booming 
economies in many African countries, Turkey has also 
invested in communications through Turkish Airlines, 
which currently flies to 38 destinations in 23 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa (MFA, 2013).
In terms of development aid, the main institution through 
which official aid is channelled to Africa is the Turkish 
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA). In 2011 only, 
while official development assistance (ODA) fell in 16 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-
Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) coun-
tries, Turkey’s net ODA increased by over 38%. Turkey has 
undertaken several initiatives in the past few years in the 
development field, e.g. hosting the UN Istanbul Somalia 
Conference on May 21st-23rd 2010, designed to support the 
Djibouti Peace Process. Specifically, the Istanbul Declara-
tion adopted during the conference is seen as constituting 
a road map for the settlement of the Somali issue. In 
Somalia, Turkey has become the largest donor among 
non-OECD-DAC countries. Also in 2010, Turkey co-chaired 
with Egypt the International Donors’ Conference for the 
Reconstruction and Development of Darfur in Cairo. During 
the conference Turkey announced a pledge of around 
$65-70 million of humanitarian assistance mainly in the 
health, agricultural and education sectors. Furthermore, 
through TİKA,3 Turkish international aid and development 
projects have steadily increased in Africa over the last 
several years (The Guardian, 2013). TİKA has been carrying 
out development projects and activities in Sudan, Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Gambia. Three main programmes that are 
specifically designed for Africa should be highlighted:  
“The Agricultural Development Programme for the Conti-
nent of Africa”, “The African Health Programme” and  
“The Vocational Training Programme for Africa”. In 2009 
development aid to Africa by Turkish governmental organi-
sations was worth nearly $44 million; in 2012 ODA was 
increased to $772 million (Kurban, 2013).  
The “benevolent partner” discourse  
and its implications
Politically, Turkish foreign policy discourse towards Africa 
has been built on two pillars. The first is the importance of 
historical ties. For example, Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu (2012) explained the importance of Somalia for 
Turkish interests by underlining the Ottoman expeditions to 
that country during the 16th century. He stated that “We 
have inherited these [relations] from the Ottomans. They 
call us neo-Ottomans. Yes, we are neo-Ottomans”  
(Euroactive, 2009). In a press conference he praised the 
intensifying relations with Africa: “We are proud of this … 
culturally, we see ourselves as African. We do not have  
a bad memory with Africa, but a good history to share” 
(Zaman, 2011). This leads to the second pillar of Turkey’s 
political discourse towards Africa, which takes the form of 
a clear anti-colonial discourse. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu 
has repeatedly highlighted that Turkey is not like “others” 
– referring specifically to Western states – that had  
a colonial past in Africa. Moreover, Turkish discourse 
towards Africa sees the Turks as “friends” who fought 
against colonialism with Africans. Similarly, in a speech 
Davutoğlu delivered at the Africa-Turkey Partnership 
Ministerial Review Conference (December 15th-16th 2011), 
he affirmed:
Stretching hundreds of years back, our history tells us 
that the well-being of Africa and Turkey cannot be 
separated from each other. Within a relationship based 
on equality, mutual respect, cooperation and common 
stance against adversaries, the rise of African and 
Turkish civilizations were always closely linked. At 
times when we were able to strengthen our interac-
tions, cultural links, trade connections and political 
positions, we were triumphant and prosperous. How-
ever, when our ties and defenses were weakened due to 
many reasons including imperialism, colonialism, 
conflicts, or inner strife, we were both weakened and 
fell back behind other nations and groupings. Economi-
cally, we have everything to gain from ever closer 
interaction (Davutoğlu, 2011).
2 African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN Mission in the Republic of 
South  Sudan (UNMISS) and UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).
3 TİKA currently has three offices in Africa, in Ethiopia, Sudan and Senegal. TİKA offices support development projects in their respective regions and from these three 
offices the organisation operates in 37 African countries.
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This speech clearly reflects the underlying rationale of this 
anti-colonial, historical and political discourse, i.e. the 
possible economic and political gains offered by the 
Turkish presence in Africa. At the same conference 
Davutoğlu continued his speech as follows: 
The most affluent nations in the world carry out most of 
their economic activities among themselves. We would 
not like to play the role of peripheral attachments to 
far-away economic centres. Rather, we prefer to grow 
as strong economic entities in our core regions and 
negotiate with other partners from positions of strength 
(Davutoğlu, 2011).
Clearly, this anti-colonial discourse helps to sustain 
Turkey’s increasing involvement in sub-Saharan Africa 
while obtaining important political support for the country 
from African countries, as well as economic opportunities 
in the continent.
Challenges ahead
As has become clear, Turkey’s increasing involvement in 
Africa can be understood in terms of its political, economic, 
and development aid ambitions and motivations, framed 
through close economic ties with sub-Saharan countries 
(in the form of diplomatic activity, trade and aid), which are 
not only aimed at exploiting the sub-Saharan market, but 
also at establishing a Turkish presence in Africa vis-à-vis 
other, mainly Western, but also Southern, donor countries. 
To some extent Turkey’s renewed involvement with Africa 
can be seen as a consequence of the country’s domestic 
transformation in the sense that it has moved away from its 
traditional economic partners, but is also a result of 
 changes in the global political economy that require the 
diversification of Turkey’s trade alternatives, in this case 
through development aid policies and discourses. Turkey’s 
response to these shifts has been to define a multidimen-
sional foreign policy based on the development of economic 
and political relations with new partners. In this sense, 
Turkey’s opening to Africa is a major part of this new 
redefinition of the country’s foreign policy (Özkan, 2010).
From the perspective of the targets of these policies and 
approaches, some suggest that African reactions to 
Turkey’s initiative thus far have been a “mixture of mild 
expectation and confusion” (Özkan, 2010). Following China 
and India, the question of why Turkey has shown what 
some consider to be an unexpected interest in the conti-
nent still does not have a clear answer for Turkey’s African 
partners. Nevertheless, Turkey’s lack of a colonial history 
in the continent and its emphasis on an equal partnership 
with African countries has spread optimism about the 
future of the relationship among African leaders  
(Özkan, 2010).
It is still yet to be established to what extent these new 
approaches and discourses can actually help to build up  
a sustainable and mutually beneficial cooperation relation-
ship that has a positive impact on the living conditions of 
African people, or whether Turkey’s new orientation 
towards Africa simply ends up reflecting the old principle of 
“business as usual”.
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